In discussing and unpacking Judith Butler’s first few chapters, I found the issue of identity politics – and particularly, the role of gender in said political machinations – to be quite problematic. As Butler notes, “the question of ‘the subject’ is crucial for politics” (Butler 3).
Herein lies the issue though, at the very definition of the political subject. The very basis that there exists a subject, a quantifiable entity or defining characteristic that galvanizes a political “body” implies that there is indeed an identifiable being known as “woman.” It requires a commonality, some sort of (nearly) all-encompassing umbrella under which countless subscriptions can huddle. But what is that commonality? How is it defined? Is it the physiological features of the female body – as in, anyone with female reproductive organs? Or is it culturally contextual, revolving the execution of performative gestures that suggest feminine (like Eddie Izzard)? Are identity politics (in relation to “women”) really that simple?
Butler certainly recognizes this “assumption that the term women denotes a common identity,” that if “one ‘is’ a woman, that is surely not all one is; the term fails to be exhaustive…because gender is not constituted coherently or consistently in different historical contexts” that “intersect with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities” (Butler 4). Indeed, attempting to embody (pun intended) identity in such a comprehensive manner cannot only be bogus, it can be quite damaging. In the process of activating a political body, we are obscuring other facets of identity, and in some cases, erasing them, for the sake of progress. But then again, as Butler notes, without a subject, how does one make the political and social strides that the feminist movement has undoubtedly secured? Although it feels a bit like circular reasoning, I do feel that this discrepancy is increasingly significant, and one that is worthy of considerable thought.
I suppose the question I was left with (among many others, of course) is -- How can we reconcile the need for political agency through mobilized masses, while still maintaining the significantly unique identity of constituents? In the highly-charged and diverse political arenas that we now operate in, is the construction of gender outdated, and if so, can we ever get away from our reliance upon such an ingrained structure of thinking and judging?
- terese
Terese,
ReplyDeleteGreat focus here on one of Butler’s key issues. I especially like your treatment of the sometimes circular nature of the musings on this issue of politics vs. philosophy (indeed, I think the circularity in and of itself is important) with regard to subject formation.
A few things I wonder about after reading your post:
What did you find most problematic? Is it similar to, or different than, what you think Butler finds problematic? Is there a way in which philosophical texts like this one can better serve politics, or are these two discourses bound to be at odds? Do you think it is possible to both embrace the category of woman politically and also reject it philosophically? Or is something lost here? And does mobilization HAVE to come en masse, or would there be another (compelling) option?
I wonder, too, if you think that the questions Butler asks about gender have important ramifications in other discourses such as racial, class-based, or sexuality-based identity politics, to name a few. Are these topics equally in need of interrogation? If not, why not? Is there something about embodiment that makes some of these issues trickier than others?
Continue with these questions as we keep reading. I hope that you’ll be able to find some interesting insight and (even) answers in our class discussions and reading. Great job!