As our discussion of Foucault’s History of Sexuality continues, the correlation between restriction and discourse – or perhaps more appropriately, restriction through discourse – becomes more and more evident. While the notion in and of itself isn’t groundbreaking or mind-blowing, it certainly has me thinking more critically about the constraining effects of a gender-based language, which Butler introduced via Luce Irigaray. Indeed, perhaps gender discourse, similar to sexuality discourse, has been effectively policed by a faulty language that, whether intentional or not, serves to limit progress and legitimacy.
In class, Foucault’s “’discursive fact,’ the way sex is put into discourse” (Foucault 11) suggests that, while we may speak much about sexuality, the way in which sex is discussed is perhaps more indicative of the true nature of sexuality than what is said. Our class discussion of the many types of paraphalia was a perfect demonstration of how the “scientification” of sex, while allowing for a supposed objective discourse, also allows those who do not fall under these clinical categorizations renounce these as alien, deviant behavior. It acts as a mechanism for those outside of the categories to judge and marginalize those who have been deemed as deviant.
Similarly for Butler and Irigaray, the very basis of discourse suggests oppression, with the “totalizing goal” of excluding the feminine altogether through a “phallogocentric signifying economy” (Butler 13). It follows then, to suggest that one of the biggest hurdles to some semblance of a comprehensive, unbiased gender discourse is the lack of a language through which we can conduct this discourse; that the discourse itself, whether seemingly progressive, is self-defeating in terms of the “other.” If we operate through a structurally weighted language that is indeed phallogocentric, then any communication that does attempts to open up discourse on gender roles outside of the dominant role is rendered ultimately futile.
As we read more and more of these foundational texts, many commonalities and correlations are starting to emerge. The most problematic to me at this point is this very point – that the existence of discourse doesn’t carry much value if the manner in which we communicate it, and the language through which we conduct it, is inherently fallacious. Both Foucault and Butler seem to be driving this point home to me, which has me questioning all sorts of “progress” we’ve supposedly claimed in identity politics that goes beyond just gender, but also ethnicity, religion, political persuasion, etc. Like the title suggest, I suppose I’m seeing just how cheap our “talk” can be and has been.
-terese
Works Cited
Butler, Judith Butler. Gender Trouble, Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge Classics, 1990. Print.
Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality: Volume 1 – An Introduction. Random House, Inc. 1978. Print.
Hey Terese,
ReplyDeleteGreat post--I'm glad to see you working through the significance of what these texts have to say and claim about the ways in which discourse produces and confines meaning, particularly as it affects identity politics and the political projects (most often, oppression of marginalized groups) that such politics are mobilized to confront. In this sense, I hear you: talk is cheap, and it is troubling to realize this.
I do, however, think that there's lots to be said for working within the conundrum of language (rather than feeling like one must escape to make some sort of progress). For one, I'd advocate that learning the "value"--however cheap it is--of talk is a type of progress in and of itself. But I also wonder if there might be ways in which language's inherent fallacious nature (as you usefully put it) might also be something one can work with. We'll talk about this in class tomorrow, but I'm curious about what you thought of the end of the Foucault you read for tomorrow (which contains some of the most talked-over passages in the book in the critical discourse we're studying). What do you think of his named rallying points? Is there a way in which they work with language, or are they totally outside the discursive sphere? Is there such a thing as outside discourse?
Great thoughts here, and I'm pleased to see you grappling with these big issues. Keep working them through--and I hope we can work as a class toward countering some of the useful, yet also at times stagnating, negativity of Foucault.